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The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism
John 0. McGinnis*
Many conservatives (at the least the subset who are classical liberals) approve of
global multilateral trade agreements and allied agreements that keep global capital
markets open. Conservatives, however, tend to be openly skeptical of other global
multilateral agreements, be they environmental accords, human rights conventions,
military pacts, or an agreement on an international criminal court. In this paper I offer
the beginnings of a framework of sound political economy that justifies these
divergent intuitions and shows that they are rooted in more than just a reflexive liking
for trade combined with a disdain for the environment, human rights, criminal justice,
and world peace.
I begin with an important caveat. This paper offers an account of global
multilateralism at a necessarily high level of generality, given the space liriitations for
the essays in this collection. It does not seek to defend or critique the actual operation
of particular global multilateral treaties, although it occasionally uses some treaties as
examples. Specifically, it does not defend the particular structure of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") or criticize particular environmental or human rights
treaties.' I also recognize that the guidelines it offers for global multilateralism may be
too pristine for the world of practical politics where compromise is frequently
necessary. But before we begin the necessary task of compromising, it is useful to get
our theoretical baselines right. This paper thus presents a sketch of what a Kantian
would call "a regulatory ideal"-a model by which we should inform the concrete
practices of global multilateralism.

* Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The direction for this collection of essays was to

footnote lightly and I followed this mandate with delight. My thanks to David Bernstein and Peter
Spiro for helpful comments. I am also very grateful to Mark Movsesian for his comments and his
collaboration on a forthcoming paper about the WTO, which prompted many of these thoughts.
Thanks to Jeremy Rabkin for his encouragement and to John Bolton for the invitation.
1. A defense of some aspects of the WTO is set out inJohn 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, The

World Trade Constitution,114 Harv L Rev (forthcoming 2000).
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I. THE PROPER GOALS OF MULTILATERALISM
The first step in assessing the proper scope of global multilateralism is to define
it as a set of globally-based mechanisms of governance to change in some formal way
the conduct of nations and through these effects change the behavior of their citizens.?
Viewed from this perspective, global multilateralism is a constitutive mechanism that
can be justified, like any constitutive mechanism, only if it improves the well-being of
the citizens of the participatory nations. Thus, one's view of the appropriate scope of
multilateralism depends on ones general approach to constitutionalism. That
approach in turn must be grounded in ones assessment of human nature.
It is beyond the scope of this short paper to offer a complete description of the
appropriate goals of constitutionalism in light of the realities of human nature. But
here is a beginning. Humans, like many other animals that live in groups, have two
modes of gaining resources-both backed by a set of instincts One is exchange by
which they provide goods and services in return for other goods or services (or, in the
modern economy, money). The other is hierarchy, by which they gain goods and
services on the basis of their position and status in the social order.
If exchange is the prevalent mode of acquiring resources in society, wealth
increases because individuals gain incentives to create what others want. If hierarchy is
the prevalent mode of acquisition, wealth dissipates because individuals fear to create
what others can take by virtue of their position in the social hierarchy. Hierarchy also
breeds conflict, because it increases pressure to displace others in a fixed pecking
order. Moreover, it is natural for each citizen in a hierarchy to regard his fellow
citizens either as sources of wealth he can seize or as threats to his property.4 The
prospect of acquisition through hierarchy thus sows suspicion and division.
Accordingly, for moral as well as economic reasons, constitutive structures of
government such as multilateralism should aim at promoting exchange and
constraining hierarchy.' Expanding the market across national boundaries obviously

International multilateralism affects nations and their citizens less directly than domestic
constitutive structures affect citizens. In international relations today, force is rarely used to compel
nations to comply with global multilateral agreements. Nevertheless, the premise for this essay
(which I actually defend only in the context of trade multilateralism and even then in a cursory way)
is that multilateralism does have some effects on the participating nations and that those effects flow
from the content of those multilateral agreements.
3. I offer a more complete explanation in John 0. McGinnis, The Human Constitution and Constitutive
Law: A Prolegomenon, 8 J Contemp Leg Issues 211, 222 (1997). See also Mark F. Grady and Michael
T. McGuire, A Theory of the Origin of NaturalLaw, 8J Contemp Leg Issues 87, 89 (1997) (describing
similar dual modes of acquiring resources in chimpanzees, our closest animal relative).
4. SeeJohn 0. McGinnis and Michael B.Rappaport, The Casefor Supermajority Rules, 98 Pol Rev 45, 56
(1999).
s. I here speak of global multilateralism, because I want to make clear that I am not speaking of the
European Union or other multilateral agreements among regional neighbors.
2.
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promotes the exchange mode of gaining resources because the market is itself an
important form of exchange. Advancing democratic forms restrains hierarchy, because
pluralistic democracy is more successful than despotic forms of government at
impeding rulers and their supporters from using the government to secure resources
for themselves at the expense of the general citizenry.'
Even in a democracy large and diverse enough to inhibit majority tyranny,
however, minority factions in the form of special interests can use their greater
leverage to gain resources through hierarchy at the expense of the public. Additional
mechanisms are therefore needed to assure, in Mancur Olson's phrase, that a nation is
governed by an "encompassing interest" rather than by special interests.7 Such an
encompassing interest-the diffuse majority or supermajority of citizens-has less
incentive than special interests to engage in the expropriation of resources through
government-what public choice theorists term rent-seeking-because it would then
be taking resources from itself' Therefore mechanisms that promote governance by
the encompassing interest reduce the opportunities for expropriation through
hierarchy.
Jurisdictional competition among sovereign nations is a primary mechanism for
empowering the "encompassing interest" of a nation and reducing the ability of
interest groups to take resources from the government. Under jurisdictional
competition, sovereigns compete by providing efficient levels of public goods. Leaders
are thereby restrained from rewarding themselves, their supporters, or influential
special interest groups.' A large, diverse democracy, where interest groups are held in
check by jurisdictional competition, substantially reduces the incentives for individuals
to seek rents through government action. Individuals will instead spend their time, on
balance, in relatively more productive and peaceful activity.
Thus, considered most abstractly, good forms of multilateralism would help
sustain one of three key forms of decentralized order that promotes governance by the
encompassing interest-democracy, jurisdictional competition, and competitive
economic markets. The source of competitive economic markets can be enlarged
6. This is the defense of the continental republic given in Federalist No 10. For further discussion of
the importance of an extended democratic sphere in limiting the endurance of any single majority
faction's control, see David A. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist99-107 (Chicago 1984).
The size of democracy necessary to accomplish this has probably declined since Madison's time,
because the complex division of labor in the modern world has created more interest groups, see
McGinnis and Rappaport, 98 Pol Rev at 50 (cited in note 4), thus making it harder for any majority
faction to maintain control.
7.

See Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships 15-16
(Basic 2000) (discussing the need to restrain interest groups to assure that prosperity).

8. Id.
9. See John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitutionand Its Decline:A Public Choice Perspective,21 HarvJ L
& Pub Pol 195, 205-06 (1997) (describing manner in which jurisdictional competition in the
original Constitution limited government).
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either by extending markets or by correcting market failure in a manner that does not
create more costs than benefits. Such a decentralized regime, which we might term
"good multilateralism," diffuses power throughout the productive citizenry. It would
help ensure that the social order reflects the spontaneous decisions of the many rather
than the fiat of a few politicians or bureaucrats wielding governmental power or a
relatively few special interest groups holding disproportionate leverage over its
exercise.
Allowed to hold global sway, spontaneous order facilitated by multilateralism
can create wealth and reduce conflict in a manner perhaps unprecedented in human
history." On the other hand, centralizing power in international bureaucracies at the
expense of markets, democracy, or jurisdictional competition-what we might call
"bad multilateralism"-could interfere with markets and provide power to special
interests on a global scale, reducing the power of the encompassing interests of various
nations to govern themselves. The beneficence of a new world order thus will depend
crucially on the forms of multilateralism we create.
Having established the appropriate goals of multilateralism I offer three general
axes for investigating whether a particular form of multilateralism is justified. After
laying out these axes, I will then briefly address the conceptual framework behind four
different kinds of multilateral agreements-those concerning trade, human rights,
regulation, and an international criminal court-and the use of force. Finally, and very
tentatively, I will suggest the factors that should determine the conditions under
which such multilateral agreements might deserve support.
A. Mutuality of Gains. Multilateralism is appropriate only when the agreement
provides gains to all parties to the agreement and when the gains could not be realized
by the nations acting individually. The requirement of mutual gains is important
because an agreement that exploits one nation for another's advantage will be unstable
and internationally divisive. The requirement that nations cannot otherwise achieve
the gains individually flows from a basic principle of subsidiarity. So long as they are
of a sufficient size, localized institutions are easier to control by an encompassing
interest than distant ones. Therefore, multilateralism should be used only when the
gains for one nation are contingent on the actions of another."
B. Facilitationof the Encompassing Interest. Second, global multilateralism should
facilitate the governance of participating nations by an encompassing interest. For
instance, if a multilateral agreement increases jurisdictional competition among
nations in areas where there are no substantial externalities, this development will be a
substantial benefit. Indeed, in my view, the defining virtue of sovereignty is its
maintenance of jurisdictional competition. Jurisdictional competition creates another
10.

For firther discussion of the virtues of spontaneous order, see F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation

and

Liberty: A New Statement of the LiberalPrinciplesofJustice and PoliticalEconomy 35-52 (Chicago 1973).
11. On this point, see Stephen D. Krasner, Power and Constraint,1 ChiJ Ind L 239 (2000).
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market-a market for governance in which governments must compete to provide a
high ratio of public goods to taxes and other exactions. Without that high ratio,
capital and businesses will exit.12 Given this benefit, I believe that the right multilateral
agreements can strengthen sovereignty by intensifying jurisdictional competition while
the wrong ones can weaken it by extinguishing the competition.
C. Light ElaborationMechanisms. The final criterion concerns the substantiality of
the elaboration mechanism needed to make global multilateralism work. In a sense,
this third criterion is a corollary of the second. If complex international mechanisms
with plenary authority are needed to sustain the agreement, such agreements would
run a high risk of capture by special interest groups because such institutions are
distant from the polities affected by them.13 They would narrow the encompassing
interest by which nations should be governed. They also may create an unaccountable
international bureaucracy which would have incentives to seize international authority
to the detriment ofjurisdictional competition.
For this reason, it is always important to assess whether other structures more
conducive to rule by an encompassing interest will accomplish the desired result of a
particular form of multilateralism. I suggest, for instance, that trade multilateralism,
with its decentralizing virtues, may accomplish some of the goals of human rights
multilateralism without its risks of centralization.
Thus, opposing multilateral structures for specific categories of regulation, such
as criminal law, human rights, or military intervention, does not mean that the goals
of such multilateralism are themselves undesirable, only that their international
structures have more costs than benefits. For instance, in some cases the greater
centralization required to impose these goals through international ordering will lead
to substantial losses in human welfare. I now turn to a more specific but necessarily
brief discussion of each kind of multilateralism to assess how each fares in light of
these criteria.
II. TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. Mutual Gains. Trade agreements, including agreements to permit free trade in
goods and services and to preserve open capital markets, are the multilateral
agreements easiest to defend. First, they create wealth among all nations that are a
party to them. According to the well-established theory of comparative advantage,
nations prosper when they specialize in the goods and services they can produce most

The advantages of jurisdictional competition over centralized regulation are discussed at much
greater length in McGinnis and Movsesian, 114 Harv L Rev (cited in note 1).
13. See Paul B. Stephan, Symposium: Institutionsfor InternationalEconomic Integration:Accountability and
International Lawmaking-Rules, Rents and Legtimacy, 17J Intl L Bus 681, 699-701 (1996) (citizens face
higher costs in monitoring international rules than domestic rules).
12.
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efficiently." Thus, the mutuality of wealth creation gives all nations a stake in
sustaining these agreements."
It is true that unilateral free trade is beneficial, but multilateral free trade creates
even greater benefits by encouraging more efficient use of factors of production. That
is one reason to create multilateral institutions: to encourage trade. The other reason
lies in domestic political economy. Protectionist interest groups have a tendency to
resist free trade. By reducing tariff barriers in other countries, exporter interest groups
are mobilized to fight for free trade. 6 Thus, not only are there mutual gains to be
realized from free trade, there is reason to believe that the mutual gains are contingent
on the political action of other states. The political contingency of tariff reductions in
one country on tariff reductions in other countries provides the best rationale for
trade policies to be pursued through global multilateralism.
B. Relatively Simple Elaboration.The second advantage of trade agreements is that
they need relatively simple elaboration mechanisms. This follows from the simple fact
that they reduce tariffs and other constraints on markets rather than increase them.
For instance, reducing tariffs takes no positive regulation at all. Eliminating non-tariff
barriers does not require a substantial administrative apparatus either, because an
arbitral system can enforce relatively determinate non-discrimination rules.' 7 The
relatively streamlined enforcement structure of the trade regime enhances the
desirability of trade multilateralism because public choice has suggested that a
substantial administrative apparatus is subject to capture by interest groups."

14. See Todd G. Buchholz, New Ideasfrom Dead Economists: An Introduction to Modern Econonic Thought
67-73 (New American Library 1990).
i5. Citizens in the nations party to these agreements become better off as well, and this growing
prosperity makes the nations more stable and more likely to keep their agreements. I realize that
some may claim that trade increases inequality and thereby instability, but I disagree. It is a corollary
of comparative advantage that trade increases the average income of citizens in a nation. Judge
Richard Posner has shown, in turn, that increasing average incomes in a society increases political
stability. See Richard A. Posner, Equality, Wealth and PoliticalStability, 13 J L Econ & Org 344, 344
(1997).
16. In The World Trade Constitution, Professor Movsesian and I argue that this mobilization of producer
interest groups also has benefits to the domestic political structure of democracies. McGinnis and
Movsesian, 114 Harv L Rev (cited in note 1).
17. Professor Movsesian and I demonstrate this in The World Constitution. We also address NGOs at
length in that article-a subject which I do not discuss because of space limitations here. McGinnis
and Movsesian, 114 Harv L Rev (cited in note 1).
AS. While I do not fully address here the very important issue of how multilateral agreements are
ultimately enforced (see note 4), I will briefly discuss some of the factors that help sustain trade
multilateralism. Unlike domestic legal obligations, trade multilateral obligations are not enforced by
coercive sovereign power because they are pacts among sovereign powers. Trade multilateralism thus
must create its own dynamic of enforcement by changing interests within nations so their
governments will respect the agreements. First, multilateral trade agreements provide more wealth to
export groups, giving these groups an interest in their enforcement. Second, they provide more
wealth or status to rulers. In despotisms the form of wealth provided is the higher taxes or other
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C. Facilitatingthe EncompassingInterest. Other elements of global economic
integration empower the encompassing interest within nations by facilitating
jurisdictional competition-what I have called the defining virtue of sovereignty. As
the century ends, capital has become more mobile both because of technological
factors, like electronic transfers, and legal trends, like the relaxation in exchange
controls. 9 The latter development has been encouraged by multilateral agreements,
like the International Monetary Fund.' Mobile capital, in turn, increases the pressures
of regulatory competition and helps it provide benefits even when individuals cannot
move from nation to nation.2' Thus, open capital markets and investment agreements
help make sovereignty work on behalf of the encompassing interest of society.2
For all these reasons, multilateral trade agreements can, in concept, provide
usefil mechanisms for sustaining markets and governing societies by a broad
encompassing interest. Multilateral trade agreements might ultimately create a world
constitutive mechanism that resembles the original Constitution of the United
States.' The Constitution promoted decentralized order by creating a market for
governance where open capital markets and free trade forced state governments to
deliver public goods in an efficient manner. This system sustained very substantial
growth and limited governmental expenditures.24

exactions rulers can enjoy from faster growing economies sustained by trade. In democracies rulers
benefit from the greater likelihood of retaining political power because of higher economic growth.
As trade agreements reinforce markers, so is their enforcement facilitated by growth in markets.
They are, in this sense, a self-sustaining system.
19. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
20.

Harv L Rev 1573, 1575 (2000).
See, for example, Articles of the International Monetary Fund, TIAS no 1501, 2 UNTS 39, Art

VIII, § 2(a) July 22,1944), as amended, 20 UST 2775, 29 UST 2203, TIAS no 11898 (prohibiting
the imposition of "restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international

transactions").
21.

For full discussion of this argument, see Walter Oates and Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition
Among Jurisdictions:Efficiency Enhancing, 35 J Pub Econ 330 (1988). Oates and Schwab assume
individuals cannot move amongjurisdictions. Id at 336.

22.

Sebastian Mallaby suggested that some might argue that beneficial jurisdictional competition are
actually detrimental races to the bottom. See transcript of comments of Sebastian Mallaby, AEI
Conference (on file with CJIL). Professor Movsesian and I discuss this argument at some length in
the World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv L Rev (cited in note 1).

23. See John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International
Federalism, 18 Cardozo L Rev 903, 916 (1996) (offering an extended comparison between
24.

international trade regime and the original Constitution).
See Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of PoliticalInstitutions:Market PreservingFederalism and Economic
Development, 11J L Econ & Org 1, 24-28 (1995).
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS
Multilateralism under the rubric of human rights comes in at least three
categories-property rights, welfare rights, and civil rights." I will analyze the
advisability of multilateral agreements in each category, but given the fact that these
categories seem to be difficult to keep separate in the world of politics, it may well be a
mistake to undertake global multilateralism in any of the categories unless on balance
we believe the results of internationalization for all categories are good.
A. Multilateral Property Rights. Under the criteria we have discussed, the most
appropriate area for human rights multilateralism would be basic property rightsrights to keep one's property, including property in one's person, free from
government expropriation and retrospective interference.' The Takings Clause and
the Contracts Clause of the US Constitution are examples of such basic property
rights that should be protected. Agreement on such rudimentary property rights
would increase all nations' wealth as each nation would gain advantages from trade
through the increased entrepreneurship that stems from protecting and stimulating
exchange.
Nevertheless, basic property rights do not appear to be contingent on
multilateralism in the strong sense that reduction in tariffs may be. As discussed
above, a multilateral agreement to reduce mutual tariffs may help reduce tariffs at
home, because the prospect of lower tariffs abroad mobilizes exporter interest groups
to counterbalance protectionist groups. In contrast, it is difficult to see how a
multilateral agreement on property rights mobilizes any groups to support property
rights who would not otherwise do so. In other words, the prospect that Indians will
enjoy more property rights if China provides more property rights for its citizens will
not prompt, at least directly, any group in China to push harder for property rights.'
Under the criteria for multilateralism advanced above, property rights do have
other advantages. By limiting government exactions, they extend markets and restrain
2s. Once again I wish to make dear that I am only talking about multilateral enforcement of human
rights-that is requiring countries to comply with certain human rights standards through an
international mechanism of governance. I regard agitation for human rights through private boycotts
and criticism of countries' human rights standards as a beneficial mechanism for encouraging human
rights-a mechanism that has almost no downside.
26. I say rights ofproperty broadly construed, because, like James Madison, I construe many rights that
are now termed civil liberties as property rights against the government. For instance, like Madison,
I think the First Amendment protects a property right in our opinions and the free communication
of them. See John 0. McGinnis, The Once and FutureProperty Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U Chi
L Rev 49 (1996).
27. To be sure, jurisdictional competition may pressure China to grant such rights because capital is
likely to move to countries with strong property rights. But this kind of jurisdictional competition
can flourish so long as the world enjoys free trade and open capital markets. No specific agreements
on the content of property rights within a nation, like the right to contract, are necessary to sustain
such competition.
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hierarchy. Moreover, being entirely negative in character, they do not require the
elaborate administrative enforcement mechanisms necessary to formulate positive
regulations. (The Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause, for instance, were
enforced by courts.) Nevertheless, property rights cannot be enforced as easily as antidiscrimination rules of trade agreements. With Professor Mark L. Movsesian I have
argued elsewhere that trade discrimination can be policed by a procedurally oriented
regime that does not encroach on substantive decision-making.2 In contrast, decisions
to invalidate regulations on the basis of property rights would require balancing
substantive justifications for regulation against the strength of the property right at
issue. It would thus generate greater pressure on the legitimacy of international
institutions because they would intrude more on perceived sovereign autonomy.
B. MultilateralWelfare Rigbts. Thus, while the case for international property
rights is not as strong as that for trade agreements, the factors that should define the
proper scope of international political economy do not entirely militate against
international property rights. It is interesting to observe, however, that multilateral
human rights conventions are notable for their neglect of property rights. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,29 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights," and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights3' offer guarantees of all sorts of civil and political rights. They even secure
including, in one case, the right to have the
welfare rights against the government,
32
government assure paid holidays!
The preference of multilateral human rights conventions for welfare rights over
property rights illustrates the danger that the multilateral process can be captured by
interest groups, including political elites. Politicians (and bureaucrats) negotiate
agreements and government programs providing welfare rights. Those agreements
and programs then empower politicians (and bureaucrats) because they determine the
beneficiaries of programs and the sources of revenues that fund them. 3 Interest groups
prefer welfare rights because they are potential beneficiaries. In contrast, property
rights restrain the power of politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups, and thus they
See McGinnis and Movsesian, 114 Harv L Rev (cited in note 1).
29. GA Res 217A(III), at 71, UN Doc A/810 (1948).
30. 6 ILM 360 (1966).
31. 999 UNTS 171 (1966).
32. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art 7(d) (cited in note 30). In
contrast, none of these conventions contain a right to compensation against takings of property or of
other specific property rights, such as the right to contract. Of the three conventions only the
Universal Declaration mentions property rights and it provides only the "right to own property" and
right not to be "arbitrarily" deprived of "property." Art 17 (cited in note 29). It provides no
specification of what constitutes property.
33. See Enrico Colombatto and Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic
Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 Cardozo L Rev 925 (1996) (suggesting that
politicians and bureaucrats try to expand their jurisdiction and power through agreements).
28.
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are less likely to include such provisions in these international agreements.' The
encompassing interest of citizens is unlikely to be able to counteract the influence of
interest groups over these formulations, because they have substantial difficulty in
monitoring the details of international agreements." Moreover, the taxes and
regulations that sustain welfare rights in each nation are less likely to be limited by
jurisdictional competition if they are coordinated at the international level.
Finally, assuming that some kinds of welfare rights can constitute public goods
that the government should supply, it is clear that levels must depend upon the
budgetary constraints of individual nations. If such welfare rights are to take account
of the differing circumstances of various nations and their traditions, substantial
discretion must be given to international institutions charged with their elaboration.
This discretion, in turn, gives rise to the problems of bureaucratic aggrandizement and
domination of unrepresentative elites-in this case the international law publicists
and the international human rights community." Thus, the international elaboration
of welfare rights is likely to reduce rather than reinforce the ability of the
encompassing interest to govern individual nations.
C. Multilateral Civil Rights. The final category of rights is civil rights, such as rights
connected to democracy, like voting and the panoply of rights connected to the
criminal justice system. Since civil rights do not result in direct transfers of resources,
and their effects on the distribution of resources are usually unclear, they are likely to
be less interest group-driven than welfare rights and thus centralizing them is less
likely to lead to rules favorable to interest groups. But, like property rights, civil rights
lack the strongly contingent nature that provides the best justification for
multilateralism. The international elaboration of civil rights by a multilateral
mechanism in one nation does not directly generate civil rights in another. 7
Moreover, centralization through multilateral mechanisms could lead to losses
because different bundles of civil rights are likely to be optimal for different
jurisdictions. In an ideal world, the advantage of more decentralized structures

34.

35.

Some might contend that those with various forms of property might form a rent-seeking fiction as
well. I do not disagree with this observation but property rights, not welfare rights, would inhibit
such factions from using the government to expropriate others' property or to otherwise foreclose
their opportunities. Moreover, our era of rapid technological change is always minting new groups of
wealthy entrepreneurs, thus reducing the opportunity for any one property-based faction to become
entrenched.
See note 13 and accompanying text.

36. See Andy Olson, An Empire of Scbolars: Transnational Lawyers and the Rule of Opinio Juris, 29
Perspectives Pol Sci 23 (2000) (showing that international publicists form a closed epistemic
community with substantial leverage on shaping content of international law).
37. I acknowledge the example of civil rights in one nation may powerfully influence citizens in another
nation, but this example does not need multilateralism to make itself felt. CNN and other forms of
communication, not multilateral agreements, are the connecting forests over which the wildfire of
rights is spreading.

o.
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preserved by sovereignty is that civil rights, like other publicsgoods, can be adapted to
the peculiar circumstances of individual nations.' More generally, many civil rights
concern the proper mix of the personal discipline necessary for republican government
to flourish and the personal liberty necessary for citizens to enjoy the benefits of their
republic.39 It would be very surprising if that mix did not differ somewhat based on the
history and level of development of the society. Even if we were sure that one bundle
was right for every jurisdiction, why should we be so sure that an international process
will in the long run approximate the correct mix of human rights better than the
average domestic process?' Centralizing the elaboration of human rights may in fact
perpetuate error.
Sadly, however, we do not live in an ideal world in which substantial
jurisdictional competition among sovereigns leads to bundles of rights appropriate for
different countries. Jurisdictional competition in civil rights is inhibited by the relative
immobility of persons. With Professor Movsesian, I have argued elsewhere on the
basis of recent economic models that jurisdictional competition is likely to be
conducive to nations adopting a good set of regulations that directly affect businesses,
because it will tend to force regulations at the margin to be equal to their costs by
reducing wages in proportion to costs. 2 This effect may well not occur in the civil

rights area because civil rights, unlike regulations affecting businesses, do not directly
affect employee wages. Jurisdictional competition thus cannot be relied upon, at least
in the short- or medium-term, to put pressure on nations to move toward providing
their citizens with an optimal bundle of civil rights.

D. The Trade Alternative for Diffusing InternationalRights. Because of the inefficacy
of jurisdictional competition in this area, the case for multilateralism in civil rights is
38. See Dennis C. Mueller, ConstitutionalDemocracy 77 (Oxford 1996).
39. See, for example, Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties,45 Kan L Rev 1045 (1997) (suggesting
that centralizing civil rights enforcement through the incorporation doctrine has made it more
difficult to experiment for the right balance).
40. I recognize that the premise of Kenneth Roth's comments at the AEI Conference was that
multilateral processes were likely to generate a better bundle of human rights than our own domestic
process, but I do not believe that he provided strong support for this premise. See Kenneth Roth,
The Charadeof US Ratificationof InternationalHuman Rights Treaties, 1 ChiJ Intl L 347 (2000).
41. For instance, centrally incorporating rights will make it harder to change those rights when they
cease to be optimal. The world changes and rights that may have been efficient at one time may
cease to be efficient. I will take a hypothetical criminal procedure-a Miranda type warning-that is
not expressly in the ICCPR but which could represent an implementation of the 15(g) requirement
that "no one be compelled to testify against himself." The efficiency of such a right at any moment
depends on the absence of less costly alternatives that would prevent police misbehavior. The danger
of codifying international rights is that they will become difficult to change in light of circumstances.
Obviously, this isless of a risk if the multilateral agreement prohibits only activities that could not be
justified under any circumstances and in any country, like torture or slave labor. I would put basic
property rights in this class as well.
42.
McGinnis and Movsesian, 114 Harv L Rev (cited in note 1).
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far better than the case for multilateral welfare rights. But we also should consider
whether there are alternative ways to promote civil rights-ones that carry less risk of
international structures imposing conceptions of rights that are mistaken or do not fit
particular countries. In my view, multilateral trade agreements are such a mechanism.
These agreements can facilitate the expansion of civil rights not through fiat but
through encouraging a process which will generate pressure for such rights internally.
Civil rights correlate highly with societal wealth.: This accords with historical
evidence that a rising middle class demands civil and political rights to help secure its
swelling wealth against the dangers of tyrannical government and political instability 4
Thus, trade agreements are likely to lead over time to a broader diffusion of civil
rights. This bottom-up model of diffusing human rights through economic growth
will lead, in the long run, to a more optimal bundle of rights that better fits the needs
of each nation than the top-down model of human rights conventions. Rights
generated internally are more likely to take account of the particular preferences and
traditions of individual countries. Moreover, they are more likely to resist political
gusts that put pressure on rights because they will be more securely rooted in the soil
of these countries.
The potential of multilateral trade agreements to cascade into civil rights has one
other important advantage over the direct international pursuit of human rights: it is
more likely to be honored by despotic leaders. The most glaring defect of
multilateralism in human rights is that it does not appear to help the peoples whose
bundle of rights is grossly suboptimal. Many countries that have signed the most
important human rights conventions, nevertheless continue systematically to abuse
the civil and political rights of their people and resist basic democracy. This is true
even of agreements that prohibit universally condemned conduct, like torture.
In contrast, despots are more likely to honor trade multilateralism, because
expanding trade will make their nations richer and therefore redound to their personal
advantage by permitting them to increase their tax revenues and other exactions. By
offering attractive bait to hook despotic regimes, multilateral trade agreements may
actually provide a more effective, if circuitous, route to securing civil and political
rights than civil and political rights conventions themselves.
IV. REGULATORY MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
With one important possible exception, multilateral agreements that seek
agreement on regulatory issues are more problematic than either trade agreements or
See James D. Gwartney, et al, Economic Freedom of the World, 1975-1995 xxii (Fraser Institute 1995)
(showing that citizens in wealthier countries enjoy greater protection for civil rights than those in
poorer countries).
44. See John 0. McGinnis, A New Agenda for International Human Rigbts: Economic Freedom, 48 Cath L
43.

Rev 1029, 1032 (1999).
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human rights agreements (except for those on welfare) because they require many
more complex institutions of elaboration that give additional leverage to special
interests. By weakening jurisdictional competition they are also likely to strengthen
the power of special interests as against the power of encompassing interests.
Nevertheless, one cannot rule out completely the need for multilateral regulatory
agreements when nations impose substantial externalities on other nations, as may be
the case with some forms of global pollution.
First, a word on terminology. The push for new international regulatory regimes
often goes by the name of "harmonization." When used in the context of regulatory
regimes this term conjures up an image of citizens of many nations happily singing in
harmony. But nations, like individuals, differ in their circumstances and endowments,
and therefore the process of imposing similar regulations is likely to give rise to the
opportunity for some nations to take resources from others. Of course, some
individuals and groups will also systematically benefit from harmonization because
they will either be in a position to influence them to their advantage or to gain status
and power from implementing the regulatory changes. For this reason, there is always
the danger that regulatory harmonization will become the song of the oligarchs.:
Harmonization creates particular danger in the international context, at least
where there are no clear externalities among countries. First, mutual gains are unlikely
to arise from international multilateral regulations in such circumstances. Countries
differ in their level of development, traditions, and preferences of their people and are
likely to choose different regulations. While it is true that a multilateral regulatory
regime could permit different nations to have different regulations, the principle of
subsidiarity suggests that it is best not to allow one jurisdiction to have a formal input
into another jurisdiction's regulatory regime.' Moreover, absent externalities, the
beneficence of one nation's regulatory regime is not contingent on the beneficence of
another nation's regulatory regime.47
Second, unlike the case of trade multilateralism, international regulation
interferes with the operation of markets. This necessarily also makes its enforcement
more bureaucratic, because the relevant agreements will have to formulate regulations
rather than simply remove barriers. As we have seen in the case of international
welfare rights, such multilateral structures can narrow rather than expand the

45.

My colleague Arthur Jacobson has made this point. In an excellent essay he shows that Plato
understood the limits of the harmonizing function of law. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Origins of The

Game Theory of Law and the Limits of Harmony in Plato's Laws, 20 Cardozo L Rev 1335, 1336-37
(1999).

46. See note 11 and accompanying text.
47. Some have argued that one regulatory system is contingent on another because of races to the
bottom, but I do not believe races to the bottom are pervasive (see note 42 and accompanying text).
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encompassing interest that should govern even in a domestic society.48 Multilateral
regulatory regimes also may reduce jurisdictional competition among sovereign
nations. For reasons discussed above, this reduction strengthens hierarchy and
narrows the encompassing interest that should ideally govern society. If trade
multilateralism has the virtues of the original Constitution, regulatory multilateralism
has all the dangers of centralized New Deal regulation. Moreover, special interest
groups will have even greater advantages at influencing international regulatory bodies,
both because they are more distant from the diffuse citizenry and because their
exactions will not be limited by regulatory competition. 9
The one area in which the welfare gains from coordinating a uniform, standard
might outweigh the losses are cases of externalities-where one nation, for instance,
pollutes the territory of another. Such externalities create incentives for free-riding:"°
since each country does not pay the full cost of its pollution, each country lacks the
appropriate incentives to reduce pollution to reflect its real costs and benefits.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that global multilateral structures of regulation
provide the proper solution to international externalities.
Because of interest group capture and the reduction of regulatory competition,
even domestic regulation to resolve externalities may cause more welfare losses than
gains' As discussed above, the problems of interest group capture and the loss of
jurisdictional competition are likely to be even more severe at the level of global
48. As with the case of welfare rights, interests groups are likely to be even more empowered by
international regulatory structures than by domestic structures, because these structures are even
more distant from the average citizen.
49. Thus, even if one is an enthusiast for the New Deal as opposed to the original Constitution, there is
reason to be more worried about centralized international regulatory regimes. I am not sure that
Professor Slaughter has responded adequately to these concerns. See Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Building Global Democracy, 1 Chi J Ind L 223 (2000). Her international network of regulators could
easily fail to be controlled by the encompassing interest of society and degenerate into a regime in
which elites and interest groups would please themselves at the expense of the public. Professor Kal
Raustiala suggests that the analogy to the New Deal may actually strengthen the case for regulation,
because society now demands the New Deal structures. See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and
Multilateralism,1 ChiJ Ind L 401 (2000). My own view is that most of our New Deal structures exist
because of inertia. When we consider new government programs today we do not build them on
New Deal principles. Witness, for example, the enthusiasm for personal savings accounts as
opposed to more collectivist retirement programs inaugurated in the New Deal. Professor Slaughter
herself acknowledges that the New Deal paradigm could lose its luster internationally as it loses
luster domestically. See Anne-Marie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law,

and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in John G. Ruggie, ed, Multilateralism Matters: The
Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form 125, 147 (Columbia 1993).
5o. Barry C. Field and Cleve E. Willis, Environmental Economics: A Guide to Information Sources, 64-81,
422-470 (Gale 1994) (explaining international tragedy of the commons in pollution).
51. See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling EnvironmentalRisks Through Economic Incentives, 13 Colum J Envir
L 153, 154 (1988) (suggesting that American environmental policy "has grown to a point where it
amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style central planning of the economy to
achieve its goals").
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multilateralism. Moreover, monitoring compliance in the international context may
also pose peculiar difficulties. For instance, nations will be unlikely to enter into an
agreement to solve an environmental tragedy of the commons problem unless there
exists some mechanism for policing compliance by other parties 2 But such
mechanisms may raise substantial concerns about sovereignty. On the other hand, if
enforcement mechanisms are weak, compliance failures lead to an increase in freeriding. A global multilateral agreement would then simply cause administrative costs

and distract from other possible solutions."s
Accordingly, the political externalities of global multilateral regulatory
agreements may well outweigh the regulatory externalities that need to be addressed.'
Indeed, regulatory regimes liable to be influenced by special interests create a tragedy
of the commons problem similar in its structure to that caused by externalities of
productive activity, because the special interests are able to use government to gain
resources for themselves and impose losses on the diffuse public."5 And, unlike the case
of productive activity, special interests do not create useful goods and services while
imposing these losses!
Thus, given these costs and the danger that large international regulatory
bureaucracies will metastasize and eradicate jurisdictional competition, other more
decentralized solutions to externalities should be sought before considering regulatory
multilateralism. I do not have space to give examples, but the development of common
law providing against externalities is one possible route. 6 For instance, under common
law principles, individuals who are harmed by pollution can sue the offenders even if

Id. See also Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: BalancingPolitical Participationand Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 Tex L Rev
1203, 1222 (1997) (noting that bargaining costs can make it hard to reach agreements to solve
commons problems).
53. I should make clear once again that I am talking about global multilateralism. Multilateral
environmental regulation in the European Union and surrounding states, for instance, is likely to
cause fewer problems. Such states are likely to be closer in development and in values. Such afinity
will make it easier to agree on the scope and seriousness of the environmental problem and solve it.
Any regional multilateral mechanism for enforcement is also likely to seem less distant and cause
fewer fears about sovereignty. Above all, the rent-seeking potential of regional regulatory multilateral
arrangements will be disciplined by the open capital markets in the international trade regime. Thus,
one implication of my discussion is that the jurisdictional competition facilitated by the international
trade regime may make regional regulatory arrangements to address externalities more attractive.
54. For an excellent exploration of this problem in the context of domestic environmental regulation, see
Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
EnvironmentalRegulation and Reform, 73 Tulane L Rev 845 (1999).
5. See McGinnis and Rappaport, 98 Pol Rev at 49 (cited in note 4) (describing the manner in which
big government and special interests create a tragedy of the commons).
56. See Zywicki, 73 Tulane L Rev at 847 (cited in note 54) (recommending the common law rather
than centralized environmental regulation as a solution to the commons problem).
52.
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they are in another jurisdiction. 7 To be sure, for these suits to be effective there must
be agreements that enable the plaintiff to gain personal jurisdiction over the offender
and for the plaintiff to enforce his judgment. But the latter agreements are already
implicit in international notions of comity and the former would not require
international agencies to make substantive decisions that could be subject to undue
influence by interest groups. Indeed, like trade regimes, the only requirement should
be that, in order to gain jurisdiction over foreign nationals, nations commit to apply
their laws against pollution in a non-discriminatory way. In that way, the same
accountability that results in fair treatment of nationals will be extended to foreigners.
On the basis of this review of the political economy of global multilateralism,
multilateral agreements on regulations should be limited to areas that meet four
conditions. First, the externalities must be clear. Second, the agreements must offer a
real prospect that the externality problem can be solved. Third, other less centralized
mechanisms that would accomplish the job must be unavailable. Fourth, restraints
must be devised to prevent multilateral institutions addressing externalities from
becoming an engine of interest group rent-seeking. If these conditions are all met,
global regulatory multilateralism may well be a sensible approach. Even under these
conditions, however, global regulatory multilateralism does not reinforce the
decentralized order and generate the cascading benefits of global trade multilateralism.
In other words, global regulatory multilateralism is at best a necessary evil, while the
right kind of global trade multilateralism could be an almost unmitigated good.
V. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

While the United States has not yet acceded to the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court ("ICC"), most nations of the world have become parties
to the treaty by which it was established. Its jurisdiction is so far limited to such
matters as genocide and war crimes." In my view, the ICC suffers from many of the
same problems as other multilateral regulatory regimes because criminal law is a
species of regulation. The apparatus for enforcing international criminal law, like that
for enforcing international regulations, would be less accountable than criminal law
enforcement in particular countries. Moreover, as a result of the lack of accountability,
interest groups could have disproportionate influence on the formulation and
57. At the conference Professor Raustiala was openly skeptical of the possibility of this kind of approach
to environmental problems. But others more familiar than I with the details of environmental
regulation have suggested that these schemes are feasible. In the domestic context, Richard Epstein
has recently recommended reviving common law nuisance suits (brought by the state, if necessary,
on public trust grounds) in order to vindicate property rights against pollution. See Richard A.
Epstein, Too Pragmatic by Half, 109 Yale L J 1639, 1652 (2000) (reviewing Daniel Farber, Eco-

Pragmatism:Making Sensible EnvironmentalDecisions in an Uncertain World (Chicago 1999)).
58. For a description of the international court's jurisdiction, see Cara Levy Rodriguez, Slaying the
Monster: Why the United States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty, 14 Am U Intl L Rev 805 (1999).
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enforcement of the rules. In the case of the ICC, the interest groups would be less
likely to be economic interest groups like trade associations, than groups arranged
around an ideology, ethnicity or nationality. For the same reasons, discussed above,
the diffuse citizenry will be less well-positioned to monitor and counteract the
influence of such interest groups than they would be in the domestic context.
In particular, the ICC necessarily contemplates, as do all systems of justice,
lodging substantial discretion in a prosecutor. A domestic prosecutor is subject to all
sorts of checks that make it easier for the diffuse public to monitor his conduct.59 He is
either elected or appointed by an elected official. Moreover, his performance is of
substantial interest to the public because putting people in jail in the numbers
domestic prosecutors do affects the crime rate where they live.
The lack of formal and informal constraints on an international prosecutor is
striking. While he would be appointed by a consensus of governments, he would be
accountable to no particular official. Because his docket would consist of cases that,
for all their moral importance, would not be likely to affect the crime rates in many
jurisdictions, he will come under less popular scrutiny. Nevertheless, ethnic and
ideological interest groups will be very concerned with the symbolic value of
prosecutions in the areas over which the court has been given jurisdiction. Thus, just
as monitoring will be particularly difficult, interest group pressure will be particularly
intense.
The result of the combination of interest group pressures and public inattention
creates a risk that the international prosecutor will not follow neutral principles in
carrying out his mandate. In this way the ICC may become a threat to the very rule of
law its advocates want to inculcate in the international order, since the multilateral
structure is not amenable to the control by the encompassing interest of society. It is
very surprising to me that enthusiasm for an international criminal prosecutor
continues unabated in many quarters of the United States, when we have become
disillusioned with our own institution of the independent counsel. The lack of
accountability and risk to neutral principles that an international criminal prosecutor
poses are very similar to those created by the office of independent counsel.
Once again, a better way of vindicating justice in the long run may be to increase
wealth through trade. As countries become wealthier they become more serious about
prosecuting official abuse, even that which does not rise to the seriousness of genocide
and war crimes. Extradition treaties can extend the reach of domestic criminal law of
willing sovereigns without endangering principles of accountability.

59. John Bolton highlights the relative accountability of international and domestic prosecutors. See
John Bolton, Reject and Oppose the InternationalCriminal Court, in John Bolton, Toward an International
Criminal Court? 37-38 (Council on Foreign Relations 1999).
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VI. MULTILATERAL ARMED FORCE
The framework offered here also can address the benefits and dangers of
mechanisms for multilateral armed force. First, we need to assess the mutual gains
from multilateral armed force on behalf of international peace. The argument for
global multilateralism in this area must rest on a version of the externalities argument
that justifies international regulations. Peace is a benefit to all nations because wars
kill people, reduce wealth, and create the dangers of even wider conflicts, thus causing
potential harm to the citizens of all nations. Intervention to prevent war, however, is
also costly both in terms of lives lost and productive opportunities forgone and
therefore nations tend to free-ride on the actions of others. This tendency produces
less peacekeeping intervention than would be mutually beneficial. Accordingly,
multilateral mechanisms through the United Nations or other organizations are
useful to create a force for joint action.
But even if the gains from global multilateralism could be mutual in theory, there
is a serious question of whether they will prove so in practice. Threats to peace around
the world have differential impacts on various nations. A war in Africa is a tragedy for
the nations involved and perhaps their neighbors but it makes little difference for
those in South America. Thus, the calculus involved in joining a global multilateral
military structure differs substantially from that involved in joining a regional
structure with more defined goals. For instance, NATO faced a very substantial
potential threat from the Soviet Union. The mutual gains garnered by facing down
this threat in large measure accrued to all members of NATO. It might be argued
that given the very unpredictability of threats, there are nevertheless mutual gains to
be achieved through such global multilateralism. But as the gains become more
speculative, the cohesiveness of the multilateral approach will decrease as nations tend
to focus on the near term.
Assessing the degree of mutual gains is essential before acceding to global
military multilateralism because such multilateralism has costs that are now familiar.
Once again it will be difficult to make sure that the multilateral use of force will be
controlled by the encompassing interest of nations for the common good. This
problem besets even our own domestic use of force." The US Constitution requires
Congress to declare war because, as a popularly elected body it represents the
encompassing interest of society. It makes the president the commander-in-chief so
that there is political accountability even in the operational decisions of war-making.
It will be a daunting task to build similar checks and balances into the exercise of
multilateral forces. The United Nations is not a legislature with elected

6o. See John 0. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order of War Powers, 47 Case W Res L Rev 1317 (1997)
(arguing that the central purpose of the War Powers Clause is to ensure that the President's
decision to go to war reflects the public interest, rather than his personal ambition).
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representatives. The military commanders of UN forces also have less than clear lines
of accountability. As we have discussed above, a diffuse citizenry has more difficulty
exercising control over international institutions. The corollary here, as elsewhere, is
that organized interests and elites will wield more influence. Thus, the institutional
structure of global multilateralism cannot generate much confidence that military
multilateralism will operate in the public interest.
This is not to say, of course, that multilateral interventions will never be in the
interest of US citizens. But we need to rely on our own domestic institutional
arrangements to these determinations rather than agree to participate in multilateral
mechanisms that will bind us to determinations made elsewhere. For instance, we
should not accept the idea offered by some academics that UN authorization should
become a substitute for our own domestic processes for authorizing wars." We can
pool our military resources with other countries when necessary without acceding to
global multilateral mechanisms in the area of national security.
VII. CONCLUSION

Because of the decline in information and transportation costs, globalization is
inevitable and with globalization comes a new world order. Nevertheless, this new
world order is still inhabited by the same humans, shaped by millions of years of
evolution to acquire resources through both exchange and hierarchy. Because the new
world order addresses old political problems, we can use the tools ofpolitical economy
and constitutionalism to address which forms of global multilateralism are justified. In
my view such considerations suggest that trade multilateralism is the best form of
global multilateralism because it can extend exchange by sustaining a global market. It
also promotes the rule of nations by their encompassing interests. Other forms of
global multilateralism may sometimes be necessary, but even these instances are
unlikely to create the pervasive benefits of trade multilateralism.

61.

See, for example, Thomas M. Franck and Faiza Pael, UN Police Action in Lieu of War "The Old Order
Cbangetb, 85 AmJ Inl L 63,74 (1991).
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